Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted a periodic review of the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, and particulate matter, as required by the Clean Air Act. After an extensive eleven-year process, EPA decided to retain the existing standards for nitrogen oxides and particulate matter, while lowering the secondary standard for sulfur oxides. EPA also issued a memorandum explaining its view that the new rule would not change air quality or emissions and thus would have no effect on endangered species or their habitats.Previously, EPA published its proposed rule in April 2024, followed by the final rule in December 2024. The agency’s no-effect determination stated that the revisions would not trigger additional emissions reductions or affect listed species. The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) challenged EPA’s rule, arguing that the agency violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA) by failing to consult with federal wildlife agencies before issuing the rule. CBD asserted that ongoing and cumulative pollutant effects could harm species, and that EPA’s effects determination was both arbitrary and untimely.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that CBD had standing to bring the challenge, but ultimately determined that EPA’s no-effect finding was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. The court explained that the rule would not cause any changes to air quality or emissions, and thus would not trigger consultation obligations under the ESA. The court also held that EPA’s timing of the effects determination was appropriate under regulatory requirements. The main holding is that EPA reasonably determined the rule would have no effect on protected species or critical habitat, and the petition for review was denied. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA" on Justia Law

Venture Global CP2 LNG and Venture Global CP Express sought authorization from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to construct and operate a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminal and an 85-mile pipeline in Louisiana. FERC’s review included extensive environmental analysis in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), resulting in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and a Supplemental EIS (SEIS). Both assessments concluded that, with recommended mitigation measures, the project’s environmental impacts, including those on air quality and the commercial fishing industry, would not be significant.Individuals and advocacy groups challenged FERC’s authorization, raising eleven alleged errors under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) and NEPA. After FERC’s initial order in 2024, the challengers sought rehearing. FERC partially granted rehearing to address concerns raised by recent D.C. Circuit decisions and directed additional environmental review, which led to the SEIS. The SEIS found no exceedances of relevant air quality standards for the terminal and compressor station. FERC reaffirmed its authorization in 2025, and subsequent rehearing requests were denied. The challengers then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC’s interpretation and application of the NGA was lawful and not arbitrary, emphasizing the presumption in favor of terminal authorization under Section 3, absent an affirmative showing of inconsistency with the public interest. The court found FERC’s NEPA analysis reasonable, deferring to FERC’s use of established air quality standards and its reliance on expert agency data. The court also upheld FERC’s treatment of cumulative impacts and harm to commercial fisheries as sufficiently addressed and explained. The petitions for review were denied in full. View "For a Better Bayou v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Eximbank) agreed to lend up to $5 billion to support the development of a major liquefied natural gas project in Mozambique. After insurgent attacks in the project area halted operations, Eximbank approved an amendment in 2025 to allow disbursement of funds on a revised schedule. Two environmental organizations, Friends of the Earth U.S. and Justiça Ambiental, argued that Eximbank’s actions violated statutory requirements by failing to provide a notice-and-comment period or disclose certain economic and environmental analyses before approving the amendment. The organizations claimed the project’s restart would intensify local conflict, cause environmental harm, and impair their ability to serve affected communities.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the plaintiffs were unlikely to show standing for most of their claims, including lack of a notice-and-comment period and diversion of organizational resources. However, the district court concluded they had a substantial likelihood of standing on an informational injury theory relating to Eximbank’s failure to provide environmental information, but determined the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits for any of their claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction. The court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the plaintiffs failed to establish organizational standing because their alleged injuries were either not particularized or too attenuated. The court concluded the plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial likelihood of informational standing for environmental information but failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, because NEPA does not apply to projects with effects entirely outside U.S. jurisdiction and Eximbank’s disclosure obligations were not triggered. The denial of the preliminary injunction was therefore affirmed. View "Friends of the Earth v. Export-Import Bank" on Justia Law

Two synthetic chemicals, PFOA and PFOS—members of the PFAS group often called “forever chemicals”—have been widely used since the 1940s and are highly persistent in the environment and the human body. Scientific studies have linked exposure to these chemicals to serious health conditions, including cancer and developmental delays. In 2024, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) designated PFOA and PFOS as “hazardous substances” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which governs the cleanup of hazardous substances and allows for cost recovery from polluters.This designation was challenged by seven industry groups representing entities that use, transport, or discharge PFOA and PFOS. The challengers argued that EPA misinterpreted CERCLA’s standard for designating hazardous substances, failed to provide adequate notice regarding its cost-benefit analysis, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by regulating in the face of scientific and economic uncertainties. They also argued that the designation violated the Administrative Procedure Act and constitutional doctrines.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that EPA acted within its statutory authority: CERCLA allows EPA to designate substances that “may present substantial danger” upon release, and the agency’s interpretation of “may” as requiring only the possibility, rather than certainty, of substantial harm was consistent with statutory text and precedent. The court concluded that EPA provided adequate notice and opportunity for public comment regarding its cost-benefit analysis, and that the agency’s rulemaking was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court also held that the agency’s actions did not violate constitutional doctrines. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review, upholding EPA’s designation of PFOA and PFOS as hazardous substances. View "Chamber of Commerce v. EPA" on Justia Law

Acadia Aqua Farms applied in 2019 for a twenty-year aquaculture lease in Eastern Bay, Maine, proposing to cultivate blue mussels using floating equipment, including a harvesting machine and a permanently moored storage raft. The company planned to operate seasonally, with routine maintenance and harvesting involving mechanized equipment. The Department of Marine Resources held a public hearing, allowing testimony from Acadia, intervenors such as Friends of Eastern Bay, and the public. Concerns were raised about noise impacts on nearby research facilities, especially the Mount Desert Island Biological Lab.After review, the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Marine Resources approved the lease in October 2024, but reduced its area from the requested 48.11 acres to 19.71 acres and imposed several conditions aimed at mitigating noise and visual impacts. Friends of Eastern Bay challenged the decision in the Superior Court (Kennebec County), which, after transfer to the Business and Consumer Docket, affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. Friends then appealed, arguing the Commissioner lacked statutory authority, that the noise and other impacts were improperly assessed, and that the lease should have been treated as a discharge application requiring additional environmental review.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The Court held that the Commissioner had statutory authority to grant the lease, including approval of the storage raft as part of the aquaculture operation. It concluded that the Department’s noise mitigation requirements and factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and complied with legislative and regulatory standards. The Court also found no error in the Department’s decision not to treat the application as a discharge application, given the lack of evidence that the proposed equipment would discharge pollutants. The judgment was affirmed. View "Friends of Eastern Bay v. Department of Marine Resources" on Justia Law

In September 2024, a major fire at the Bio-Lab chemical facility in Rockdale County, Georgia, caused the release of a toxic chemical plume, resulting in an evacuation order for over 17,000 nearby residents. Many local residents subsequently sought medical attention for symptoms related to exposure to hazardous substances, including hydrogen cyanide. A group of affected residents and businesses filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against Bio-Lab and related entities, alleging negligence, trespass, nuisance, and strict liability. However, the plaintiffs did not claim present physical injury; instead, they asserted an increased risk of future disease and sought, among other remedies, an injunction requiring the creation of a defendant-funded medical monitoring program.The defendants moved to dismiss the request for equitable relief, arguing that Georgia law does not permit medical monitoring as a remedy absent allegations of present physical injury. The federal district court, finding Georgia law unclear on this issue, certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Georgia: whether a plaintiff exposed to toxic substances without present physical injury may obtain equitable relief in the form of medical monitoring, and if so, what standard applies.The Supreme Court of Georgia responded that, under Georgia law, the availability of equitable relief depends on whether the plaintiff has suffered a legally cognizable injury and whether that injury meets the established criteria for equitable relief, including the absence of an adequate remedy at law and the imminence of harm. The court declined to decide whether the specific facts of this case warranted such relief, leaving that determination to the district court. Additionally, the court concluded that the precise form and scope of equitable relief in a federal diversity case is likely governed by federal law, not state law. The certified questions were thus answered only in part. View "BIO-LAB, INC. v. TARTT" on Justia Law

Water districts in California that received water from the federal Central Valley Project sought to convert their water service contracts into repayment contracts under the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation (WIIN) Act. This conversion allowed the districts to prepay construction costs in exchange for contracts that would last indefinitely, rather than for a set term. The Bureau of Reclamation, which manages the Central Valley Project, converted 67 contracts upon request from water districts, modifying only the payment terms and leaving other contractual rights unchanged. The Bureau did not conduct contract-specific environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) or consult with wildlife agencies under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) before making these conversions.The Center for Biological Diversity and other plaintiffs challenged the Bureau’s actions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. They argued that the Bureau was required to undertake NEPA review and ESA consultation before converting each contract, because the conversions would impact the environment and protected species in the Bay-Delta ecosystem. The district court compelled joinder of the affected water districts and granted summary judgment to the Bureau and the water districts. The court found that the WIIN Act imposed a mandatory duty on the Bureau to convert contracts upon request, and that the Bureau lacked discretion to alter terms for environmental protection, so NEPA and the ESA did not apply.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that section 4011(a) of the WIIN Act requires the Bureau to convert water service contracts upon request, permitting only changes related to payment structure and not to other contractual rights. Because the conversions are nondiscretionary, the Bureau is not required to conduct NEPA review or ESA consultation. The Ninth Circuit also found that this interpretation does not violate the WIIN Act’s savings clauses. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF RECLAMATION" on Justia Law

A company applied to construct a deepwater port off the coast of Texas, including a pipeline that would cross the pipeline of another recently approved deepwater port. The relevant federal statute, the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (DWPA), requires that only one deepwater port be licensed per “application area.” An environmental group, comprised of local residents near the proposed pipeline and tank farm, objected to the approval, claiming that the pipeline should have been included in the application area. Their concerns included increased risks of flooding, pollution, and negative impacts on property value and quality of life.The United States Maritime Administration (MARAD), acting under authority delegated by the Secretary of Transportation, processed the application. Unlike with previous applications for similar projects, MARAD excluded the proposed pipeline from Texas GulfLink’s application area, reasoning that the DWPA gave it discretion to do so. MARAD then approved Texas GulfLink’s application. The environmental group filed a timely petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, challenging MARAD’s decision on the basis that it violated the DWPA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the DWPA requires the application area to encompass the entire deepwater port site, including pipelines located seaward of the high water mark. The court found MARAD’s designation of the application area to be unlawful because, if the pipeline had been properly included, the application area would overlap with that of another approved port, contrary to the DWPA’s requirement. The court granted the petition for review, vacated MARAD’s approval of the application, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Citizens for Clean Air v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

A federal agency developed a plan intended to protect Utah prairie dogs, a threatened species, while accommodating land development in parts of Utah. The plan streamlined the permit process for developers and allowed for “incidental take”—harm to prairie dogs and their habitat—on the condition that developers and agencies would minimize and mitigate those impacts. Two main types of land were involved: “major development areas,” where most development was expected, and “minor development areas,” which were less likely to be developed. The plan called for relocating prairie dogs from development sites and offsetting habitat loss through measures such as translocation, conservation banks, land acquisitions, and conservation easements. The plan anticipated the take of up to 7,152 prairie dogs and 1,750 acres of habitat over ten years.When challenged, the United States District Court for the District of Utah upheld the agency’s actions and denied the plaintiff’s claims under the Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. The plaintiff, an animal advocacy organization, argued that the agency’s plan and related permits failed to adequately minimize and mitigate impacts, did not ensure the survival and recovery of the species, and did not satisfy legal requirements for environmental analysis. The district court found the organization had standing but rejected its substantive claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to compare the biological value of lost and replacement habitats, a necessary step for meaningful mitigation. The court also found the agency’s environmental analysis under the National Environmental Policy Act deficient for relying on unsupported assumptions about habitat replacement. Other aspects of the plan, including reliance on translocation and funding mechanisms, were upheld. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision on the Endangered Species Act and National Environmental Policy Act claims and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to determine the appropriate remedy. View "Friends of Animals v. FWS" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization challenged a decision by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which approved a request by a fertilizer company to use phosphogypsum—a radioactive byproduct of fertilizer production—in the construction of a pilot road on the company’s private property in Florida. Phosphogypsum is typically stored in stacks due to its emission of radon gas, a known carcinogen. Federal regulations issued under the Clean Air Act generally prohibit its use outside of certain exceptions but allow the EPA to approve other uses if public health is protected as much as it would be by storage in stacks or mines.The EPA, after a multi-year review, found that the company's proposal included all necessary information and that the risks to workers, nearby residents, and the environment were below the applicable health thresholds. The EPA concluded that the road’s use of phosphogypsum posed no greater risk than storage and imposed ongoing monitoring requirements. The nonprofit submitted public comments opposing the approval, arguing that EPA’s action violated regulations and was arbitrary and capricious. After considering these comments, the EPA finalized its approval.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court first determined that it had jurisdiction because the petitioner had associational standing and the case was not moot. On the merits, the court held that the EPA did not violate its regulations, as the relevant rules unambiguously permit case-by-case approval of “other uses” of phosphogypsum, including road construction, provided health protections are adequate. The court also found that the EPA’s technical review and risk assessment were reasonable and well-supported, and any alleged procedural errors were harmless. The court denied the petition. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law